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Abstract 
      Mentalizing is the capacity to understand ourselves and others in terms of intentional 
mental states, such as feelings, desires, wishes, attitudes, and goals.  It is a fundamental 
capacity in our complex social environment. This paper reviews our current understanding of 
the neurobiology of mentalizing. We first summarize the key assumptions of the mentalizing 
approach to normal and disrupted development. This is followed by discussion of the 
multiple dimensions of mentalizing and our emerging knowledge of the neural circuits that 
underlie these dimensions.  We then consider the neurobiology of attachment and arousal 
regulation in relation to mentalizing, and summarize relevant studies in this area. Finally, we 
discuss the limitations of extant research and outline implications for future research. 
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Mentalizing is the capacity to understand ourselves and others in terms of intentional mental 
states, such as feelings, desires, wishes, attitudes, and goals.  It is a fundamental capacity in 
our social environment: Without this capacity, we would be completely lost in a world that is 
determined by complex and ever-changing interpersonal relationships that require a high 
degree of collaboration and mutual understanding (Fonagy, Luyten, & Allison, 2014).  
Although it is to a certain extent “pre-wired”, our capacity for mentalizing is not a given; it is 
largely a developmental achievement.  Research findings suggest that the capacity for 
mentalizing is first acquired in the context of attachment relationships, and that the extent to 
which our early and later environment fosters a focus on internal mental states is crucial for 
its development (Allen, Fonagy, & Bateman, 2008; Fonagy et al., 2010).  
      The past decade has witnessed a veritable explosion of research on mentalizing.  A quick 
search in Web of Science, for instance, shows an exponential increase in the number of 
studies in this domain, from only a handful of studies on the topic published in the 1990s to 
more than 4,000 in 2014.  The increasing popularity of the mentalizing approach to 
understanding both normal and disrupted development is explained not only by the growing 
realization that this capacity is central in human normative development; it is also explained 
by the recognition that temporary or stable disruptions in this capacity are one characteristic 
of almost all forms of psychopathology – ranging from autism and psychosis (Chung, Barch, 
& Strube, 2013) to major depression (Cusi, Nazarov, Holshausen, Macqueen, & McKinnon, 
2012; Ladegaard, Larsen, Videbech, & Lysaker, 2014; Luyten, Fonagy, Lemma, & Target, 
2012), eating disorders (Kuipers & Bekker, 2012; Skarderud, 2007), and personality 
disorders, most notably borderline personality disorder (BPD) (Fonagy & Luyten, in press). 
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  The great upsurge of interest in the role of mentalizing in development is paralleled by an 
ever-growing interest in the neural underpinnings of this capacity in the field of social and 
cognitive neuroscience (Herpertz, Jeung, Mancke, & Bertsch, 2014; Lieberman, 2007; 
Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009; Van Overwalle & 
Baetens, 2009).  These studies have fundamentally informed and shaped the mentalization-
based approach to psychopathology.  Among the many contributions within cognitive and 
affective neuroscience, two major findings stand out, and these form the backbone of this 
paper. The first of these is the finding that mentalizing is not a unitary construct, but consists 
of several dimensions that can be organized along polarities.  As we discuss in more detail in 
this paper, one of the most remarkable and important contributions of neuroscience is that 
features of mentalizing that were thought to be unitary turned out to be dissociable, which 
may explain the specific imbalances in mentalizing that can be identified in various 
psychiatric disorders.  The second major finding is from neuroscience studies which suggest 
that two interacting factors largely determine the quality of mentalizing: (a) stress or arousal 
and (b) the individual’s attachment history.  These findings have led to considerable changes 
in our understanding of the normative development of mentalizing and the mentalizing 
impairments seen in various types of psychopathology, as well as in the nature of 
interventions aimed at fostering mentalizing. This also illustrates the growing dialogue 
between neuroscience and clinical practice (see Fonagy, Luyten, & Bateman, this issue).  
      In this paper we set out where our current understanding of the neurobiology of 
mentalizing stands. We first briefly outline the core assumptions of the mentalizing approach 
to normal and disrupted development.  Next, we consider the multiple dimensions of 
mentalizing and our emerging knowledge of the neural circuits that underlie these 
dimensions.  We then focus on the neurobiology of attachment and arousal regulation in 
relation to mentalizing and outline implications for future research on the role of mentalizing 
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in normal and disrupted development. Finally, we finish by pointing to where the field may 
develop.  
 
Basic assumptions of the mentalizing approach 
The basic assumptions of the mentalizing approach to normal and disrupted development are 
depicted in Figures 1 to 3 and Table 1.  Research findings suggest that the capacity for 
mentalizing is not a constitutional given but is largely a developmental achievement that 
depends initially on the quality of the individual’s attachment relationships, in particular early 
attachments during infancy (Fonagy & Luyten, in press; Kovacs, Teglas, & Endress, 2010).  
Specifically, the extent to which attachment figures have been able to respond with 
contingent and marked affective displays of their own experience in response to the infant’s 
subjective experience is thought to be positively associated with the child’s ability to develop 
mentalizing capacities, that is, second-order representations of his/her own subjective 
experiences (see Figure 1).  This in turn positively influences affect-regulative processes and 
self-control (including attentional mechanisms and effortful control), as the development of 
the capacity to reflect on internal mental states represents a major leap in the individual’s 
capacity to regulate his/her affect.  Later in life, exposure to a wider environment (e.g., peers, 
teachers, and friends) which fosters a focus on internal mental states is thought to broaden 
and strengthen the development of mentalizing (Fonagy & Luyten, in press).  Conversely, 
failures in the process of marked mirroring from early attachment figures lead to impairments 
in the capacity to reflect on the self and others, as they lead to unmentalized self-experiences, 
also called “alien-self” experiences, which do not validate the individual’s experience and 
thus are felt as alien to the self (see Figure 2).  Such failures in marked mirroring are to a 
certain extent inevitable, and thus we all have unmentalized mental states.  In various types of 
psychopathology, however, most often as the result of a combination of biological 
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vulnerability and environmental circumstances, these alien self-experiences are so 
pronounced that they dominate the individual’s subjectivity.  This leads to a constant pressure 
to externalize these unmentalized self-experiences – which may be expressed, for instance, in 
a tendency to dominate the mind of others and/or in various types of self-harming behavior 
(Fonagy & Luyten, in press). 
      The capacity to mentalize is therefore only in part a trait-like capacity.  It is always to a 
certain extent relationship- and context-specific (e.g., mentalizing levels may considerably 
differ among relationships, or between when reflecting “off-line” on a past event versus “on-
line” in a real-life interaction).  Mentalizing, therefore, is a fundamentally bidirectional or 
transactional social process (Fonagy & Target, 1997): It is thought to develop in the context 
of interactions with others, and its quality in relation to understanding others is assumed to be 
influenced by the mentalizing capacities of those with whom we interact.  Mentalizing is also 
distinct from attentional processes and general (cognitive) reasoning, although it partly relies 
on these capacities and in turn fosters them.  Neuroimaging studies clearly demonstrate the 
existence of distinct neural circuits involved in these capacities (Van Overwalle, 2011). 
      Furthermore, mentalizing is not a unitary, unidimensional capacity.  Here, neuroscience 
findings have been particularly instrumental in defining mentalizing as being organized 
around four polarities, with each polarity having relatively distinct underlying neural circuits 
(see Table 1). These four polarities are (a) automatic versus controlled mentalizing, (b) 
mentalizing with regard to self and to others, (c) mentalizing based on external or internal 
features of self and others, and (d) cognitive versus affective mentalizing (see Table 1, and 
below) (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009; Luyten, Fonagy, Lowyck, & Vermote, 2012).  On the basis 
of this view, different types of psychopathology can be characterized by their different 
combinations of impairments along these polarities (i.e., different mentalizing profiles) (see 
Fonagy, Bateman, & Luyten, this issue).  
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      The concept of mentalizing is thus an umbrella concept, which encompasses and covers 
related constructs from social cognition research such as empathy, mindfulness and Theory of 
Mind (ToM) (Choi-Kain & Gunderson, 2008).  Empathy and ToM, for instance, tap into 
features of mentalizing about others, while mindfulness primarily involves a core component 
of mentalizing about the self (e.g., the ability to attend to one’s own internal mental states).  
Both empathy and mindfulness focus on affective components of mentalizing, while ToM is 
more about cognitive features of mentalizing (e.g., belief-desire reasoning) (although this 
concept has broadened considerably in recent years to include affect).  Mentalizing is broader 
than any of these concepts: It focuses on both self and other, and on both cognition and 
affect.  Furthermore, mentalizing also encompasses processes involved in interpreting one’s 
own mind and that of others based on external features (such as facial expressions, posture, 
and prosody) and balancing this sensitivity with knowledge about the mental interiors of both 
the self and others.  Mentalizing is thus all about the balance between the systems underlying 
these four dimensions and potential imbalances (e.g., being overly sensitive to the emotional 
states of others at the expense of reflective awareness of one’s own state of mind).  Good 
mentalizing thus balances the various systems that are responsible for being aware of how 
one feels oneself, what one thinks, and what others feel and think.  
      This balance is thought to depend on the interaction between two determining factors: (a) 
stress or arousal and (b) the use of attachment strategies in response to arousal (see Figure 3).  
As explained in more detail below, as stress or arousal increases, there is a tendency to switch 
from slow and reflective mentalizing to fast, automatic and so-called prementalizing modes 
of experiencing oneself and others (see Table 2 and Figure 3).  Automatic mentalizing tends 
to be rigid and typically involves biased assumptions about the self and others.  Individual 
differences in the use of attachment strategies are thought to influence three key parameters 
related to the switch from controlled to automatic mentalizing: (a) how readily individuals 
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switch to nonmentalizing modes, (b) the extent to which the individual loses the capacity for 
more controlled mentalizing and (c) the duration of the loss of controlled mentalizing.  As we 
will discuss, a neurobiological understanding of the relationship between arousal, attachment 
strategies, and mentalizing is particularly pertinent to our understanding of disorders that are 
characterized by extreme impairments and imbalances in mentalizing, such as BPD. 
 
The neurobiology of the mentalizing polarities 
Automatic and Controlled Mentalizing 
Findings from both behavioral science and neuroscience support a distinction between two 
different types of mentalizing underpinned by relatively distinct neural circuits. Automatic or 
implicit mentalizing presumes the use of parallel and therefore much faster processing; it is 
reflexive and requires little effort, focused attention, or intention (Satpute & Lieberman, 
2006). Automatic mentalizing seems to be our default position: We constantly tend to 
automatically “read” the mind of others.  This capacity is already present in a rudimentary 
form in infants as young as 7 months of age (Kovacs et al., 2010).  From an evolutionary 
perspective, automatic mentalizing has clear value for survival (Lieberman, 2007; Mayes, 
2006): Typical fight/flight responses are best subserved by fast (and thus automatic) 
processing of social information (e.g., when, at night in a dark alley, we see a man with a gun 
in his hand approaching us).  Yet, in many circumstances, and particularly in our complex 
interpersonal world, the switch under high arousal conditions from controlled, explicit, and 
reflective mentalizing to automatic or implicit mentalizing may not always be that adaptive – 
and particularly not in individuals who have a low threshold for such a switch, as it hampers 
their ability to pause and reflect, and so to develop appropriate models of their mind and that 
of others.  As we will discuss in more detail below, particularly in situations of increasing 
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arousal (see Figure 3), automatic mentalizing is likely to be based on simple heuristics that 
may work well under some conditions, but utterly fail to capture the complexity of human 
motivations in more complex interpersonal situations (e.g., when we find ourselves or one of 
our loved ones in a difficult love relationship, or when we are involved in a conflict at work).  
The (often much-needed) correction of biased assumptions associated with automatic 
mentalizing is exerted by controlled or explicit mentalizing, which is typically conscious, 
verbal, and reflective.  Mentalizing in real time under realistic contextual demands requires 
the capacity to reflect consciously and deliberately on and make accurate attributions about 
the emotions, thoughts, and intentions of others, and to display an accurate and balanced 
appreciation of a social situation – which relies heavily on the capacity for effortful control 
and the subtle distinctions language allows us to make.  
      In our complex contemporary social world, which demands increasingly sophisticated 
collaboration with others, considerable “computational power” is needed to develop models 
of the minds of ourselves and others (Fonagy, Luyten, & Allison, 2013a).  In this context, 
relying on automatic mentalizing is not always adaptive, leading to an evolutionary “friction-
rub” of the neural systems involved in mentalizing, particularly when automatic mentalizing 
is dominated by nonreflexive and biased assumptions about the self and others.  In the 
absence of such biases, however, automatic mentalizing may provide a very effective and 
efficient way of processing social contexts. Yet, studies tend to suggest that, even in 
normative development, automatic mentalizing is often biased toward nonreflective 
assumptions about the self and others – particularly when it is the result of high arousal (i.e., 
when feeling ashamed, embarrassed, or threatened, or when confronted with out-group 
members).  For example, this is illustrated by studies demonstrating the rapid activation of 
biased views toward people of another race in priming studies (Knutson, Mah, Manly, & 
Grafman, 2007). 
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   Many types of psychopathology, and serious personality disorder pathology in 
particular, seems to be characterized by temporary or permanent impairments in the capacity 
for controlled mentalizing (Fonagy, Luyten, & Bateman, this issue). Neuroscience findings 
have begun to shed more light on the neural circuits underpinning this capacity and therefore 
on the neurobiological basis of these disorders. 
      Automatic and controlled mentalizing seem to be subserved by two relatively different 
neural circuits.  Phylogenetically older brain circuits that rely primarily on sensory 
information appear to underlie automatic mentalizing, while controlled mentalizing involves 
phylogenetically newer brain circuits that rely more on linguistic/symbolic processing.  
Although the assignment of particular brain regions to each of these circuits currently is at 
best tentative, neural circuits underlying automatic mentalizing probably include the 
amygdala, basal ganglia, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), lateral temporal cortex 
(LTC), and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006).  These 
brain areas are primarily involved in the rapid detection of threat and the fast and automatic 
modulation and processing of (social) information. The amygdala, for instance, has been 
consistently linked to processing of the biological “value” of information, and is particularly 
reactive to facial emotional expressions; this highlights its central role in the rapid processing 
of social information in the context of the fight/flight response.  The VMPFC plays a key role 
in the modulation of the amygdala and basal ganglia, and both the VMPFC and basal ganglia 
are involved in automatic intuition.  The basal ganglia have also been shown to be involved 
in reward-related implicit emotion processing to which we will return in detail below.  The 
dACC has been implicated in nonreflective emotional distress related to both physical and 
social (i.e., exclusion) pain.  The LTC –in particular the superior temporal sulcus region – 
plays a role in fast and automatic processing of biological motion, face recognition and 
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attribution of intentions. Hence, all these regions are involved in fast and implicit processing 
of social information. 
      Controlled mentalizing involves the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC), medial prefrontal 
cortex (MPFC), the lateral parietal cortex (LPAC) and medial parietal cortex (MPAC), 
medial temporal lobe (MTL), and rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC) (Lieberman, 2007; 
Satpute & Lieberman, 2006; Uddin, Iacoboni, Lange, & Keenan, 2007).  The LPFC has been 
most consistently shown to be activated by tasks requiring asymmetrical reasoning (e.g., X 
causes Y, but this does not imply that Y causes X), requiring effortful control and involving 
considerable computational resources.  The LPAC is similarly involved in tasks that require 
reasoning, and the MPAC is involved in explicit perspective-taking.  The rACC seems to be 
involved in explicit, reflected-upon conflict processing; the MTL has been implicated in 
explicit, declarative memory.  The MPFC seems to be one of the core structures involved in 
mentalizing, but it is not clear whether this structure primarily belongs to the automatic or the 
controlled circuit, or both.  Because the MPFC is larger in humans than in other primates, and 
because cognitive load decreases its performance, it is considered to belong to the controlled 
system (Lieberman, 2007; Satpute & Lieberman, 2006; Uddin et al., 2007). 
      Given its potential evolutionary function, the capacity for automatic mentalizing appears 
to be neurally “pre-wired”.  Developmental studies suggest that automatic or implicit 
mentalizing is robust early in the second year of life (Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010) or 
perhaps even earlier, as indicated by a study that showed that babies as young as 7 months of 
age automatically encode other’s beliefs (Kovacs et al., 2010).  Verbal recognition of 
another’s perspective, by contrast, is reliable only in the fourth year (Carpendale & Lewis, 
2006) or even later, perhaps after age 8 (Gweon, Dodell-Feder, Bedny, & Saxe, 2012), which 
is probably related to language acquisition (Beeghly & Cicchetti, 1994) and the development 
of effortful control (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009).  Congruent with these speculations about the 
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potential evolutionary process underpinning the capacity for controlled mentalizing, there is a 
strong positive association between the mean social group size and the size of the neocortex 
for different species of primates (Dunbar, 2008), this is particularly notable for brain areas 
that support the large-scale social interactions characteristic of Homo sapiens.  Additionally, 
a positive correlation has been found between individual explicit mentalizing competences, 
gray matter volume of mentalizing areas as measured with voxel-based morphometry of 
magnetic resonance images, and social group size (Lewis, Rezaie, Brown, Roberts, & 
Dunbar, 2011). 
Internal and External Mentalizing 
As for the automatic versus controlled distinction, neuroimaging studies have identified two 
relatively different neural networks that underlie the capacities for internally focused and 
externally focused social cognition.  Relatively speaking, mentalizing based on external 
features of self and others (such as facial expressions, posture, and prosody) tends to recruit a 
lateral frontotemporoparietal network (e.g., posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) and 
temporal poles), which essentially is involved in less controlled and reflective processes.  
Mentalization focused on internal features (which requires the intention to represent the 
internal mental states of self and others), on the other hand, activates a medial frontoparietal 
network (e.g., MPFC), which is involved in more active and controlled reflection 
(Lieberman, 2007).  Beer, John, Scabiani, & Knight (2006), for instance, investigated patients 
with extensive damage to the MPFC and VMPFC and who showed low levels of self-
consciousness when they behaved inappropriately.  However, when these patients were 
shown a video recording of their behavior, they did show self-consciousness, and realized the 
inappropriateness of their behavior.  In these patients, mentalizing based on internal self-
monitoring did not elicit embarrassment, but watching the video recruited their intact 
externally focused self-reflection.  
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      This distinction also seems to be reflected in the ontogenesis of the capacity for 
mentalizing.  Given the nonverbal nature of infants under the age of 24 months, the only way 
parents can obtain information about their babies’ internal mental states is by relying on 
external features such as the infant’s behavior and facial expression (Beebe et al., 2008; 
Beebe et al., 2007). Hence, in early development, attachment figures are almost completely 
dependent on external cues to develop a model of the mind of their child.  Some parents seem 
to have considerable difficulty with this process, but may do much better at reflecting on the 
internal mental states of the child once he/she is older – that is, once they can rely more on 
internally directed mentalizing processes (Sharp & Fonagy, 2008).  Other parents seem to 
have the opposite problem.  As an example, Sleed and Fonagy (2010) found that some 
mothers who appeared highly attuned to their infants when their interaction with their child 
was rated from videotapes of the interaction scored low on measures of reflective function 
based on a representation of the child’s internal state assessed by Slade’s (2005) Parent 
Development Interview.  This may also explain in part the effects of parent–infant 
intervention programs that use video feedback (Beebe et al., 2008; Slade, 2005).  In such 
interventions, parents are invited to reflect together with a therapist about the possible 
meanings of their infant’s behavior and expressions, thus developing their ability to read 
others’ minds based on external features as well as linking this ability to their capacity to 
reflect on the mind of others based on internal features.  
      Hence, even within normative development, individuals may show considerable 
differences in the capacity for internally versus externally focused mentalizing.  These 
differences are frequently more pronounced in psychopathology.  For instance, studies have 
amply demonstrated major impairments in internally focused mentalizing in individuals with 
BPD, whereas these individuals appear to show little or no deficit in externally focused 
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mentalizing and may even be hypersensitive toward external social cues (see Fonagy, Luyten, 
& Bateman, this issue). 
Self and Other Mentalizing 
Neuroimaging studies have identified a core network of neural systems that is activated 
whenever individuals reflect on the self and others.  This core network consists of the medial 
prefrontal cortex and temporal poles and the pSTS/temporoparietal junction (TPJ) in the LTC 
(Frith & Frith, 2006; Lieberman, 2007; Uddin et al., 2007; Van Overwalle, 2009; Van 
Overwalle & Baetens, 2009).  Hence, a shared network seems to underpin the capacity to 
mentalize about the self and others.  Interestingly, the overlapping brain circuitry used in 
mentalizing about self and others may explain the difficulty of normally developing children 
to acquire a sense of selfhood, which in the extreme may give rise to serious difficulties with 
identity integration, as is observed in many types of psychopathology of the self.  Patients 
with BPD in particular seem to constantly struggle to free themselves from the undue 
influence of others’ mental states (which is termed identity diffusion).  
      The neuroimaging literature may help us to understand this phenomenon better: It 
suggests that two distinct neural networks are involved in self-knowing and knowing others 
(Lieberman, 2007; Uddin et al., 2007) and that patients with serious pathology of the self may 
show a marked imbalance between these two systems (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009).  Ripoll et al. 
(2013) suggested distinguishing these two systems as the shared representation (SR) system, 
in which empathic processing relies on shared representations of others’ mental states, and 
the mental state attribution (MSA) system, which relies more on symbolic and abstract 
processing.  This distinction overlaps with those suggested by Shamay-Tsoory (2011) and 
others (Dimaggio, Lysaker, Carcione, Nicolo, & Semerari, 2008; Lieberman, 2007; 
Lombardo, Barnes, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2007; Uddin et al., 2007).  
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      The SR system entails a “visceral recognition” of the experience of others without high-
level cognitive processing, based on a similarity of neural activation while experiencing and 
observing others experiencing states of mind (Lombardo et al., 2010).  It is assumed to be a 
more body-based, frontoparietal (mirror-neuron) system that is involved in understanding the 
multimodal embodied self (e.g., face and body recognition) and understanding others through 
motor-simulation mechanisms (Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 
2004; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009).  This suggests that a fundamental process allowing 
us to appreciate the actions and emotions of others involves the activation of the mirror 
neuron system for actions and the activation of visceromotor centers for the understanding of 
affect (Lombardo et al., 2010).  This is thought to be one of the key evolutionary mechanisms 
underpinning social empathy – knowing from the inside, as it were, how another feels.  
Hence, this is an implicit, automatic system, providing physical other-to-self and self-to-other 
mapping, allowing the immediate understanding (but also misunderstanding, as we shall see) 
of self and others.  SR processing is present from infancy and phylogenetically dates back to 
rodents. Neuroanatomically, it may engage the amygdala, inferior frontal gyrus, inferior 
parietal lobule (both of these zones are rich in mirror neurons; Bernhardt & Singer, 2012; 
Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009), anterior insula, and (dorsal) ACC (both of which are 
involved in observed and felt pain).  Congruent with these assumptions, Seyfarth and Cheney 
(2013) argue that trust, empathy, and sensitivity to others’ emotional states develop out of a 
largely unconscious mimicking tendency, which we share with primates and which plays a 
key role in affiliative behavior (van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & van Knippenberg, 2004).  
The SR system provides for motor empathy, underpins shared pain, and explains emotion 
contagion, as well as rudimentary recognition of intention and emotional states (Shamay-
Tsoory, 2011).  
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      While SR processing dominates early development (Decety & Michalska, 2010), because 
automatic mirroring inevitably generates distress in response to others’ distress, a further 
neural development is needed to supplement it, based on a cortical midline system consisting 
of the VMPFC and DMPFC, the TPJ and the medial temporal pole (Lieberman, 2007; Uddin 
et al., 2007).  This system is less bodily based, and processes information about the self and 
others in more abstract and symbolic ways as we have seen (Frith & Frith, 2006; Uddin et al., 
2007).  It also appears to be mainly shaped across development by interpersonal 
relationships, is phylogenetically initially found in primates, emerges fully in adolescence, 
and is neurochemically strongly linked to dopaminergic functioning (Lackner, Bowman, & 
Sabbagh, 2010).  Behaviorally, this explicit mental state attribution network underpins 
perspective-taking and both cognitive ToM (involving the DMPFC) and affective ToM 
(underpinned by the activity of the VMPFC).  It is important to note that cognitive inference 
of affect is an act of imagination that is not the same as “feeling another’s feelings”, which 
SR processing entails (Gweon et al., 2012).   
      The SR and MSA systems may be mutually inhibitory (Brass & Haggard, 2008; Brass, 
Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; Brass, Schmitt, Spengler, & Gergely, 2007), which in our opinion 
further elucidates typical features of BPD and other types of psychopathology of the self.  
Neuroimaging studies indicate that the neural regions most often recruited in the inhibition of 
imitative behavior are those involved in explicit mental state attributions.  Studies suggest 
that patients with BPD have often serious impairments in more controlled, explicit 
mentalizing (Fonagy & Luyten, in press), suggesting the existence of impairments in the 
MSA system. Hence, these individuals may experience an excessive and developmentally 
inappropriate activation of the SR system, leaving them with difficulties in decoupling their 
representation of another person’s experience from their self-representations (Fonagy & 
Luyten, 2009; Ripoll et al., 2013).  This leads to an overemphasis on others’ feelings and 
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emotions (emotional contagion) and, in turn, to confusion about the self (identity diffusion 
and feelings of inner emptiness), as well as an undue emphasis on externally oriented 
mentalizing (“jumping to conclusions”) that is difficult to modulate.  
      Although these assumptions are still somewhat speculative, decreased activity has been 
noted in the STS of patients with BPD during deliberate empathic processing (Dziobek et al., 
2011; Mier et al., 2013).  Decreased activation of the MPFC was noted during the regulation 
of provoked aggression (New et al., 2009), which may indicate an inadequate perspective-
taking stance on the part of these patients.  Similarly, a task calling for the use of 
psychological distancing from affective stimuli failed to demonstrate higher activation in the 
posterior cingulate cortex for BPD patients (Koenigsberg et al., 2009).  Dysfunction may also 
be indicated by hyperactivation of the MPFC (leading to hypermentalizing) in response to an 
experience of rejection (Ruocco et al., 2010), an important finding, as BPD has been 
associated both with hypomentalizing and hypermentalizing, particularly in the context of 
tasks involving complex interpersonal relationships (Sharp et al., 2011).  In turn, research 
findings support the assumption that BPD is associated with inappropriate activation of the 
SR system, perhaps in part because of a heightened response to stress, which inhibits the 
capacity for systematic mental state attributions (i.e., controlled mentalizing; see Figure 3).  
Amygdala hyperreactivity has been shown in individuals with BPD in response to both 
positive and negative stimuli (Hazlett et al., 2012; Mier et al., 2013; Minzenberg, Fan, New, 
Tang, & Siever, 2007), as well as in attempts by patients to regulate their response to 
negative social cues (Koenigsberg et al., 2009).  Ripoll et al. (2013) cite unpublished data 
suggesting that the lack of habituation indicated by amygdala activity is associated with 
limitations in subjective perception of social support. The anterior insula has also been shown 
to be hyperreactive during affective empathy tasks.  Dziobek et al. (2011) reported that 
during emotional empathy the right mid-insula was more strongly activated in individuals 
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with BPD than in nonclinical controls.  This anatomical region is associated with bodily 
arousal (Simmons et al., 2013), suggesting that an emotional empathy task engages BPD 
patients more than controls.  In support of this speculation, a positive association between 
right mid-insula activation and skin conductance was shown for this patient group.  King-
Casas et al. (2008) reported that BPD patients’ mistrustful reactions to fair offers in a multi-
round social exchange task with a partner were due to insula hyperreactivity, hindering more 
controlled reflective functioning about the intentions of their partner in the task.   
Cognitive and Affective Features of Mentalizing 
Full mentalizing involves the integration of cognition and affect, yet, again, both capacities 
can be relatively dissociated.  The cognitive features of mentalizing include belief-desire 
reasoning and perspective-taking, and affective features include affective empathy and 
mentalized affectivity (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002; Jurist, 2005).  The former 
aspect is typically emphasized in ToM research, and seems to overlap to a large extent with 
more controlled mentalizing, while the latter is associated with affective empathy, and is 
largely automatic and embodied (Sabbagh, 2004).  
      As with the other three dimensions of mentalizing discussed earlier, there is increasing 
evidence that distinct, though somewhat more overlapping, neurocognitive systems are 
involved in these two capacities (Sabbagh, 2004; Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007; 
Sebastian et al., 2012; Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, & Levkovitz, 2007).  Whereas 
cognitively oriented mentalization depends on several areas in the prefrontal cortex, 
affectively oriented mentalizing seems particularly related to the VMPFC. This suggests that 
the VMPFC may play an important role in “marking” mental representations of self and 
others with affective information that can subsequently be integrated with cognitive 
knowledge such as belief-desire reasoning (Rochat & Striano, 1999).  Again, a more 
automatic, embodied and lateralized system is distinguished from a cortical midline structure 
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that is more based on abstract and linguistic processing.  This has also led to speculations 
about two possible systems underlying empathy; these are a more basic “emotional 
contagion” system and a more advanced cognitive perspective-taking system, as expressed in 
notable behavioral and anatomic dissociations between deficits in cognitive empathy 
associated with the VMPFC and emotional empathy associated with the inferior frontal gyrus 
(Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, & Perry, 2009). 
Arousal, attachment and mentalizing 
A developmental psychobiological perspective 
Based on Arnsten, Mathew, Ubriani, Taylor, & Li (1999) and Mayes (2000, 2006), we have 
proposed a biobehavioral model which suggests that with increasing arousal there is a switch 
from controlled to automatic mentalizing (see Figure 3).  As we have discussed above, this 
switch serves a clear evolutionary function: the emergence in situations of threat of a 
fight/flight/freeze response has clear survival value. Both noradrenergic and dopaminergic 
systems seem to be involved in this switch which is hypothesized to protect the prefrontal 
cortex from excessive stimulation as well as facilitate the coordination among attentional, 
executive and sensory systems (Arnsten et al. 1999). For instance, norepinephrine enhances 
the activation of the prefrontal cortex, but ? 1 postsynaptic receptor stimulation impairs 
functioning, which results in turning the prefrontal cortex “off-line” and facilitating 
subcortical functioning.  Similarly, the D1 dopamine receptor family enhances prefrontal 
functioning, but under excessive catecholamine release (partly mediated by amygdala 
activation), D1 impairs functioning.  
      Yet, there are important differences between individuals in the switch point, as increasing 
stress activates not only a fight/flight/freeze response but also the attachment system, a 
behavioral system that modulates threat by prompting the individual to seek proximity to real 
or internalized attachment figures.  
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      From a neurobiological perspective, increasing stress or arousal is thus associated with a 
complex set of coordinated responses involving (a) stress regulation systems involving the 
detection and processing of stress (i.e., involving the amygdala and hypothalamic–pituitary–
adrenal (HPA) axis), (b) the mesocorticolimbic, dopaminergic system, which has also been 
described as the brain’s reward circuitry, which underlies attachment behavior (Champagne 
et al., 2004; Ferris et al., 2005; Insel & Young, 2001; Strathearn, Li, Fonagy, & Montague, 
2008), and (c) neural circuits involved in mentalizing (Bartels & Zeki, 2000, 2004; Bull, 
Phillips, & Conway, 2008; Hurlemann, Hawellek, Maier, & Dolan, 2007; Lieberman, 2007; 
Mayes, 2000, 2006; Satpute & Lieberman, 2006).  
      Individuals’ attachment history seems to be crucially important in understanding 
variations in these responses.  Individual differences in the use and strength of attachment 
hyperactivation and deactivation strategies in response to stress in particular appear to 
determine three essential parameters in the switch from prefrontal to posterior cortical 
systems, or from controlled to automatic mentalizing: (a) the threshold (intercept) at which 
the switch happens, (b) the strength or slope of the relationship between stress and the 
activation of neural circuits involved in controlled versus automatic mentalizing, and (c) the 
time to recovery from stress (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009; Fonagy & Luyten, in press; Luyten, 
Fonagy, Lowyck, et al., 2012). In the following sections, we discuss each of these factors and 
summarize the evidence that relates to them. 
Secure attachment strategies, arousal and mentalizing 
In individuals who predominantly use secure attachment strategies in response to stress, the 
activation of the attachment systems seems to foster controlled mentalizing, in combination 
with a relaxation of epistemic hypervigilance, leading to an effective down-regulation of 
stress and “broaden and build” cycles (Fredrickson, 2001) that are typically associated with 
attachment experiences. Activation of the attachment system predictably seems to involve a 
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relaxation of normal strategies of interpersonal caution.  There is good evidence that intense 
activation of the neurobehavioral system underpinning attachment is associated with the 
deactivation of arousal and affect-regulation systems (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009; Luyten, 
Fonagy, Lowyck, et al., 2012), as well as the deactivation of neurocognitive systems likely to 
generate interpersonal suspicion – that is, those systems and brain regions involved in social 
cognition or mentalizing, including the LPFC, MPFC, LPAC, MPAC, MTL, and rACC 
(Bartels & Zeki, 2000, 2004; Lieberman, 2007; Satpute & Lieberman, 2006; Van Overwalle, 
2009).  For example, with increased intimacy, regions of the brain associated with reflective 
mentalizing will be deactivated.   
      Studies suggest that neuropeptides such as opioids, oxytocin, and vasopressin play an 
important role in this process.  This role is both in activating the reward/attachment system 
and in deactivating the behavioral mechanisms involved in social avoidance and in 
attenuating both behavioral and endocrine stress responses (Heinrichs & Domes, 2008; Insel 
& Young, 2001; Panksepp & Watt, 2011).  This explains, at the neurobiological level, the 
down-regulation of arousal that is typically associated with secure attachment.  Furthermore, 
oxytocin has been found to facilitate mentalizing in these individuals, as expressed in 
improvements in social memory, memory of facial expressions and identity, enhancements of 
the recognition of mental states based on facial expressions, probably by causing selective 
fixation on the eye region when viewing faces, and increasing trust (Bartz, Zaki, Bolger, & 
Ochsner, 2011; Neumann, 2008).  Thus, the activation of the attachment system generates 
increased experience of reward, increased sensitivity to social cues, decreased stress levels, 
and decreased social avoidance, leading to so-called “broaden and build” cycles (Fredrickson, 
2001) associated with attachment security.  These findings thus shed more light on the 
neurobiology of resilience (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, Higgitt, & Target, 1994): Individuals who 
predominantly use secure attachment strategies when faced with adversity have the ability to 
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turn to (internalized) secure attachment figures in times of need, they find interpersonal 
contacts rewarding, and they have the capacity to keep controlled mentalizing “on-line” even 
when faced with considerable stress. 
      Yet, contextual factors should not be forgotten (Bartz, Zaki, et al., 2011), and mentalizing 
is not always consistently solid, even in predominantly securely attached individuals.  For 
instance, studies clearly suggest that with increasing arousal, particularly in relation to out-
group members, the likelihood of a switch to automatic mentalizing increases in everyone, 
even those who are securely attached (Bartz, Zaki, et al., 2011). In line with these findings, 
studies have reported that oxytocin administration leads to increased distrust, more bias in 
attributing intentions, and decreases in cooperative behavior with regard to out-group 
members even in normal community samples (Bartz, Zaki, et al., 2011).  Hence, the increase 
in mentalizing and relaxation of interpersonal distrust and the fight/flight response associated 
with the use of secure attachment strategies is clearly limited to close attachment figures, or 
at best to a relatively small number of people who are seen as belonging to the in-group. 
Increasing stress may simply make attachment issues more salient, which may increase the 
likelihood of a deactivation of controlled mentalizing. This was also shown in a direct 
investigation of the neural phenomena underlying the switch model in community adults, 
reporting that exposure to idiosyncratic scripts eliciting attachment-related stress resulted in 
reduced controlled mentalizing-related activation in the left pSTS, left inferior frontal gyrus 
and left TPJ. Moreover, the left middle frontal gyrus and left anterior insula showed greater 
functional connectivity to the left pSTS after attachment stress (Nolte et al., 2013). 
Attachment hyperactivating strategies 
Individuals who primarily use attachment hyperactivating strategies (strategies that reflect 
desperate attempts to find security based on the conviction that others are not there to provide 
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security and support, correlating with the anxious and preoccupied attachment styles) seem to 
be characterized by a relatively low threshold for switching to non-mentalizing modes, more 
extensive lapses in controlled mentalizing, and relatively longer time to recovery compared to 
secure individuals.  The threshold for deactivation of brain areas involved in controlled 
mentalizing seems to be relatively low, and more automatic, subcortical systems, including 
the amygdala, have a low threshold for responding to stress.   
      In these individuals, stress seems to readily activate the attachment system (seeking for 
protection), and attachment trauma may lead to chronic activation of the attachment system.  
In the situation where a child is seeking proximity to a traumatizing attachment figure (e.g., 
an abusive or neglectful parent) as a consequence of trauma, he/she is, naturally, likely to be 
further traumatized.  Prolonged activation of the attachment system may create further 
difficulty resulting from increased emotional arousal.  Many patients with BPD, for example, 
present with these features, which is unsurprising given the high prevalence of preoccupied 
and disorganized attachment as well as severe developmental trauma in this group (see 
Fonagy, Luyten, & Bateman, this issue). 
Attachment deactivation strategies 
Individuals who primarily rely on attachment deactivating strategies (i.e., individuals with 
anxious-avoidant and dismissive attachment, which involves denying attachment needs, 
asserting one’s own autonomy, independence, and strength in an attempt to downregulate 
stress based on the belief that others cannot provide support and comfort) tend to demonstrate 
fast deactivation of the attachment system and social information processing of threat cues.  
Attachment deactivating strategies have been shown to keep the neural systems involved in 
controlled mentalizing “on-line” for longer (Vrticka, Andersson, Grandjean, Sander, & 
Vuilleumier, 2008).  Hence, these individuals often resemble those who predominantly use 
secure attachment strategies.  Yet, this deactivating strategy is likely to fail under increasing 
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stress.  If securely attached individuals are those who are able to retain a relatively high 
activation of prefrontal areas in the presence of activation of the dopaminergic mesolimbic 
pathways (the attachment/reward system), then differences in mentalizing between securely 
attached individuals and individuals who primarily rely on attachment deactivating strategies 
may become apparent only under increasing stress – an assumption that is consistent with the 
findings of both experimental (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007) and neuroimaging (Vrticka et al., 
2008) studies.   
Neurobiological research on arousal, attachment and mentalizing 
Neuroscience findings converge to suggest that attachment history is indeed crucial in 
understanding the relationship between arousal and mentalizing.  Following Arnsten et al. 
(1999) and Mayes (2000), studies suggest that the threshold for switching from controlled to 
automatic mentalizing can be lowered as a result of exposure to early stress and attachment 
trauma.  There is a close relationship between stress/arousal regulation through the HPA axis 
and the amygdala, a core structure within the neural circuits that subserve automatic 
mentalizing (see above), as is, for instance, evidenced in the high prevalence of corticotropin-
releasing hormone (CRH)-expressing neurons and receptors in the amygdala (Tottenham & 
Sheridan, 2009).  Early adversity has been shown to lead to kindling of the amygdala 
(Botterill et al., 2014), again supporting the role of the amygdala in potentiating fear and the 
stress response more generally. Research also clearly suggests the presence of both structural 
and functional changes in the amygdala in individuals with impairments in mentalizing, who 
typically have a history of early adversity.  For instance, in BPD – a condition whose 
sufferers are commonly characterized by histories of high levels of early adversity – stress 
regulation, mediated by the HPA axis, is disturbed (Jogems-Kosterman, de Knijff, Kusters, & 
van Hoof, 2007; Nater et al., 2010; Scott, Levy, & Granger, 2013; Wingenfeld, Spitzer, 
Rullkotter, & Lowe, 2010).  Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies of BPD 
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patients in which the background level of stress and/or attachment system activation was 
manipulated (e.g., Minzenberg et al., 2007) confirm the abnormal pattern of frontal 
deactivation and associated hyperresponsiveness of the limbic system in a range of contexts, 
using situational induced stress (Kraus et al., 2010) and in studies of the moderating influence 
of trait arousal (Holtmann et al., 2013) (see reviews by Mier et al., 2013; Salavert et al., 
2011).  For example, Silbersweig et al. (2007) reported that under conditions of negative 
emotion and behavioral inhibition, BPD patients showed relatively decreased VMPFC 
activity (including the medial orbitofrontal and subgenual anterior cingulate cortex). Further, 
increased amygdalar–ventral striatal activity correlating with decreased constraint and 
increased negative emotion respectively.  Furthermore, BPD patients with an explicit trauma 
history show a reduction in pituitary size (Garner et al., 2007), elevated levels of CRH in 
cerebrospinal fluid (Lee, Geracioti, Kasckow, & Coccaro, 2005), dysfunctions of cortisol 
responsivity (Jogems-Kosterman et al., 2007; Minzenberg et al., 2006; Walter et al., 2008), 
and disturbed dexamethasone suppression test responses (Wingenfeld et al., 2007).  These 
dysfunctions cascade into other brain areas involved in automatic mentalizing.  For instance, 
chronic stress has been shown to disrupt amygdala–VMPFC connectivity (Tottenham & 
Sheridan, 2009). 
      Although these studies require further replication because of several methodological 
limitations, including small sample sizes, disparate experimental paradigms, and considerable 
heterogeneity in sample selection (e.g., comorbidity with depression, childhood abuse, PTSD 
and coping styles; Fertuck et al., 2006; Kahl et al., 2006), there is also more direct evidence 
concerning the neurobiological basis of the influence of individual differences in attachment 
on the relationship between arousal and mentalizing (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009; Fonagy & 
Luyten, in press).  Research to date has provided considerable evidence that activation of the 
attachment system is closely linked to arousal and stress regulation (Heinrichs & Domes, 
THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF MENTALIZING      26 
2008; Lieberman, 2007; Mayes, 2006).  This might in fact reflect an adaptation strategy by 
which the individual attempts to prepare him/herself for future threat and adverse experiences 
(Tottenham & Sheridan, 2009).  Individuals with a secure attachment history may show a 
relative relaxation of threat processing because of their repeated experiences of security.  This 
enables the relaxation of interpersonal distrust and avoidance, which will foster the 
development of the capacity for controlled mentalizing, particularly in an environment that is 
conducive to the development of this capacity.  In contrast, individuals with insecure 
attachment experiences seem to develop a hypersensitivity to threat in an attempt to deal with 
experiences of (perceived) insecurity and unpredictability of the availability and behavior of 
attachment figures. This may on the one hand lead to a pattern characteristically associated 
with attachment hyperactivation. As we have discussed above, hypersensitivity to threat, and 
the automatic processes it entails, is typically associated with an emphasis on externally 
focused mentalizing, to the neglect of more internally focused, controlled mentalizing.  
Although this is understandable as a “survival” strategy, the price these individuals pay is that 
they may increasingly hold biased and schematic assumptions about themselves and others, 
as well as being constantly hypervigilant toward others.  We have recently linked this 
hypervigilance with problems with epistemic trust, that is, a lack of openness to others as a 
source of knowledge, which seriously impairs resilience and social learning more generally 
(Fonagy et al., 2013b). BPD might be a disorder that is characterized by this pattern. On the 
other hand, individuals with insecure attachment experiences may start to excessively 
deactivate the attachment system when confronted with stress because of the (perceived) 
unavailability of attachment figures. This strategy to adapt to circumstances characterized by 
repeated failures of attachment figures to co-regulate stress seems to lead to an excessive 
emphasis on cognitive control, compulsive autonomy and a general distrust of others. Others 
and relationships are simply not rewarding, they are met with hypervigilance and distrust, 
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which may also lead to hypermentalizing. Both insecure attachment strategies – although 
adaptive in the short run – are associated with high interpersonal and metabolic costs because 
of the “wear and tear” of chronic hypervigilance and hyperactivity of the stress system 
(Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). 
      Strathearn and colleagues (Strathearn, Fonagy, Amico, & Montague, 2009; Strathearn et 
al., 2008), for instance, assessed the attachment security of 30 first-time mothers assessed 
using the Adult Attachment Interview before the birth of their child.  About 10 months after 
birth of their child, the same mothers viewed their own or others’ infants smiling and crying 
faces while the mothers underwent fMRI scanning.  Mothers with secure attachment showed 
greater activation of regions of the brain associated with reward, including the ventral 
striatum, and the oxytocin-associated hypothalamus/pituitary region.  Peripheral oxytocin 
response during contact with their infant was also significantly higher in securely attached 
mothers, and the size of change from baseline oxytocin levels was positively correlated with 
brain activation to own infants in both brain regions. Importantly, securely attached mothers 
looking at their own babies’ faces also showed greater activation in reward-processing 
regions when they viewed their infants’ sad faces, while insecure/dismissing mothers who 
predominantly used attachment deactivating strategies, in agreement with the findings 
described earlier, showed less activation of the reward system and greater insular activation 
in response to seeing their own infant’s sad face.  The insula may be a region associated with 
feelings of unfairness, pain, and disgust (see review by Montague & Lohrenz, 2007); we have 
discussed its role in the SR system, as a structure being involved in the automatic, immediate, 
embodied understanding (or misunderstanding) of others.  Mothers with insecure/dismissing 
attachment histories thus appeared less able to downregulate the sad feelings evoked in them 
by their infant’s sad faces, possibly because they felt overwhelmed by sad memories of their 
own past.  For securely attached mothers, infant cues, whether they were positive or negative 
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in affect, seemed to act as an important affective signal of “incentive salience” (Berridge, 
2007), reinforcing and motivating responsive maternal care. These mothers seemed to be 
“addicted” to their babies: viewing their babies was a rewarding experience.  Insecure 
mothers, by contrast, particularly when viewing their infants’ sad face, showed a negative 
subjective reaction that would cause them to mirror their infant’s sadness without being able 
to create a symbolic/mentalizing distance between their infant’s and their own states of mind, 
thus illustrating the potential for an immediate misunderstanding of others by the SR system. 
      Vrticka et al. (Vrticka et al., 2008) similarly found that avoidant attachment was related to 
a relative downregulation of reward-related activity, linked to the dopaminergic system, in 
striatal circuits during socially reinforcing interactions.  Hence, reward responses associated 
with the attachment system were blunted in avoidant individuals.  Yet, avoidant attachment 
was positively related to activation in the MPFC and the vACC, areas that have been 
implicated in controlled mentalizing as well as social rejection and emotion suppression.  
Anxious attachment, in contrast, was associated with increased activation in the left amygdala 
in response to negative social feedback; as we have discussed, this is a brain area that is 
typically associated with automatic processes involved in fear and arousal more generally.  
Finally, secure attachment was not associated with any distinct neural responses but mirrored 
the pattern found for avoidant and anxious attachment.  Secure attachment thus was 
positively related to the activation of the ventral striatum in response to positive 
reinforcement, but negatively with activation of the amygdala to negative reinforcement.  
Hence, in line with our assumptions, securely attached individuals simultaneously showed 
greater activation of the reward system in response to positive social reinforcement, and 
lower activation of the amygdala – and thus fear and arousal – in response to negative social 
feedback; they seemed to be able to relax their vigilance to threat.   
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      These findings are also congruent with studies showing that early adverse attachment 
experiences are associated with decreased oxytocin levels and increased cortisol response 
(Fries, Hesse, Hellhammer, & Hellhammer, 2005; Heim, Newport, Mletzko, Miller, & 
Nemeroff, 2008; Meinlschmidt & Heim, 2007).  Attachment hyperactivating and deactivating 
styles have also been related to polymorphisms in the oxytocin receptor gene in patients with 
unipolar depression (Costa et al., 2009).  Similarly, a study reported dysregulated peripheral 
oxytocin release in depressed women (Cyranowski et al., 2008), and Gotlib and colleagues 
found that adolescent girls at risk for depression exhibited decreased activation in the reward-
processing system (and specifically in striatal areas), suggesting a markedly reduced 
sensitivity to reward (Gotlib et al., 2010).  As we have discussed in more detail elsewhere 
(Luyten & Fonagy, 2013), low endogenous levels of oxytocin, polymorphisms in oxytocin-
related genes, and negative effects of oxytocin administration have also been documented in 
individuals with BPD (Bartz, Simeon, et al., 2011; Bertsch, Schmidinger, Neumann, & 
Herpertz, 2013; Cyranowski et al., 2008; Stanley & Siever, 2010). 
 
Conclusions and directions for future research 
Over the past decades, our knowledge of the neurobiology underlying mentalizing has greatly 
increased. Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, this body of knowledge has also helped us to 
better understand the psychological experiences that are associated with mentalizing and that 
mentalizing gives rise to.  The present review shows how, at the very least, neurobiology puts 
limits to psychological explanations, and rules out some views about the nature of 
mentalizing and impairments in this capacity as improbable, while rendering other 
assumptions more plausible. 
      However, more research is needed, and rapid advances in the neurosciences are likely to 
lead to considerable changes in our assumptions about mentalizing in both normal and 
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disrupted development.  With increasing technological innovations, more sophisticated views 
will emerge.  Currently, studies in this field still suffer from many limitations, including 
small sample sizes, the use of relatively simple paradigms, and lack of consideration of 
individual differences (such as individual differences in attachment style, temperament) and 
contextual factors.  For instance, attachment clearly is a dimensional construct, and thus 
individuals tend to rely on different attachment strategies to a greater or lesser extent, for 
example, depending on contextual factors.  This necessarily complicates the interpretation of 
findings.  As in psychological research, heterogeneity complicates neuroscience studies, 
particularly studies with small sample sizes.  The translation of these findings to clinical 
samples remains to be determined.  For instance, it is becoming clearer that there are 
qualitative differences between individuals with insecure but organized attachment strategies, 
and those with more disorganized attachment, as is often the case in BPD patients and in 
many patients with a history of attachment trauma (Main, 1991).  Both functional and 
structural brain differences have been identified between healthy controls and patients in 
many areas, including, as noted, with regard to the neural circuits involved in mentalizing and 
attachment (Vrticka & Vuilleumier, 2012). 
      Studies in larger samples using more ecologically valid and perhaps personalized 
paradigms, together with novel imaging methods such as brain connectivity studies, are likely 
to yield much more insight into the neurobiology of mentalizing.  Furthermore, the field of 
neuroscience is plagued by a lack of a unifying theory, even in the field of social 
cognition/mentalizing, leading different authors to emphasize different aspects of similar 
neural circuits.  It is clear that the field is not ready yet for such a unifying theory, which 
should humble anyone engaged in developing psychological theories about such a 
fundamentally human – and complex – capacity as mentalizing.  The views expressed in this 
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paper can therefore be seen only as an approximation that will undergo major changes in the 
future. 
 
References 
Allen, J., Fonagy, P., & Bateman, A. (2008). Mentalizing in clinical practice. Washington:  
American Psychiatric Press. 
Arnsten, A. F., Mathew, R., Ubriani, R., Taylor, J. R., & Li, B. M. (1999). Alpha-1 
noradrenergic receptor stimulation impairs prefrontal cortical cognitive function.  
Biological Psychiatry, 45, 26-31. 
Baillargeon, R., Scott, R. M., & He, Z. (2010). False-belief understanding in infants. Trends 
in Cognitive Sciences, 14, 110-118. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2009.12.006 
Bartels, A., & Zeki, S. (2000). The neural basis of romantic love. Neuroreport, 11, 3829-
3834. 
Bartels, A., & Zeki, S. (2004). The neural correlates of maternal and romantic love. 
NeuroImage, 21, 1155-1166. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2003.11.003 
Bartz, J., Simeon, D., Hamilton, H., Kim, S., Crystal, S., Braun, A., . . . Hollander, E. (2011). 
Oxytocin can hinder trust and cooperation in borderline personality disorder. Social Cognitive 
and Affective Neuroscience, 6, 556-563. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsq085 
Bartz, J. A., Zaki, J., Bolger, N., & Ochsner, K. N. (2011). Social effects of oxytocin in 
humans: Context and person matter. Trends in Cognitive Science, 15, 301-309. doi: 
10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.002 
Beebe, B., Badalamenti, A., Jaffe, J., Feldstein, S., Marquette, L., Helbraun, E., . . . Ellman, 
L. (2008). Distressed mothers and their infants use a less efficient timing mechanism in 
THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF MENTALIZING      32 
creating expectancies of each other's looking patterns. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 
37, 293-307. 
Beebe, B., Jaffe, J., Buck, K., Chen, H., Cohen, P., Blatt, S., . . . Andrews, H. (2007). Six-
week postpartum maternal self-criticism and dependency and 4-month mother-infant self- 
and interactive contingencies. Developmental Psychology, 43, 1360-1376. 
Beeghly, M., & Cicchetti, D. (1994). Child maltreatment, attachment, and the self system: 
Emergence of an internal state lexicon in toddlers at high social risk. Development and 
Psychopathology, 6, 5-30. 
Beer, J. S., John, O. P., Scabini, D., & Knight, R. T. (2006). Orbitofrontal cortex and social 
behavior: Integrating self-monitoring and emotion-cognition interactions. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 18, 871-879. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2006.18.6.871 
Bernhardt, B. C., & Singer, T. (2012). The neural basis of empathy. Annual Review of 
Neuroscience, 35, 1-23. doi: 10.1146/annurev-neuro-062111-150536 
Berridge, K. C. (2007). The debate over dopamine's role in reward: The case for incentive 
salience. Psychopharmacology (Berl), 191, 391-431. doi: 10.1007/s00213-006-0578-x 
Bertsch, K., Schmidinger, I., Neumann, I. D., & Herpertz, S. C. (2013). Reduced plasma 
oxytocin levels in female patients with borderline personality disorder. Hormones and 
Behavior, 63, 424-429. doi: 10.1016/j.yhbeh.2012.11.013 
Botterill, J. J., Fournier, N. M., Guskjolen, A. J., Lussier, A. L., Marks, W. N., & Kalynchuk, 
L. E. (2014). Amygdala kindling disrupts trace and delay fear conditioning with parallel 
changes in Fos protein expression throughout the limbic brain. Neuroscience, 265, 158-171. 
doi: 10.1016/j.neuroscience.2014.01.040 
THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF MENTALIZING      33 
Brass, M., & Haggard, P. (2008). The what, when, whether model of intentional action. 
Neuroscientist, 14, 319-325. doi: 10.1177/1073858408317417 
Brass, M., Ruby, P., & Spengler, S. (2009). Inhibition of imitative behaviour and social 
cognition. Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological 
Sciences, 364, 2359-2367. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2009.0066 
Brass, M., Schmitt, R. M., Spengler, S., & Gergely, G. (2007). Investigating action 
understanding: Inferential processes versus action simulation. Current Biology, 17, 2117-
2121. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2007.11.057 
Bull, R., Phillips, L. H., & Conway, C. A. (2008). The role of control functions in 
mentalizing: Dual-task studies of theory of mind and executive function. Cognition, 107, 
663-672. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2007.07.015 
Carpendale, J., & Lewis, C. (2006). How children develop social understanding. Malden, 
MA and Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
Champagne, F. A., Chretien, P., Stevenson, C. W., Zhang, T. Y., Gratton, A., & Meaney, M. 
J. (2004). Variations in nucleus accumbens dopamine associated with individual differences 
in maternal behavior in the rat. Journal of Neuroscience, 24, 4113-4123. doi: 
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5322-03.2004 
Choi-Kain, L. W., & Gunderson, J. G. (2008). Mentalization: ontogeny, assessment, and 
application in the treatment of borderline personality disorder. Am J Psychiatry, 165, 1127-
1135. doi:  
10.1176/appi.ajp.2008.07081360 
THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF MENTALIZING      34 
Chung, Y. S., Barch, D., & Strube, M. (2013). A Meta-Analysis of Mentalizing Impairments 
in Adults With Schizophrenia and Autism Spectrum Disorder. Schizophrenia Bulletin doi: 
10.1093/schbul/sbt048 
Costa, B., Pini, S., Gabelloni, P., Abelli, M., Lari, L., Cardini, A., . . . Martini, C. (2009). 
Oxytocin receptor polymorphisms and adult attachment style in patients with depression. 
Psychoneuroendocrinology, 34, 1506-1514. doi: 10.1016/j.psyneuen.2009.05.006 
Cusi, A. M., Nazarov, A., Holshausen, K., Macqueen, G. M., & McKinnon, M. C. (2012). 
Systematic review of the neural basis of social cognition in patients with mood disorders. 
Journal of Psychiatry and Neuroscience, 37, 154-169. doi: 10.1503/jpn.100179 
Cyranowski, J. M., Hofkens, T. L., Frank, E., Seltman, H., Cai, H. M., & Amico, J. A. 
(2008). Evidence of Dysregulated Peripheral Oxytocin Release Among Depressed Women. 
Psychosomatic Medicine, 70, 967-975. 
Decety, J., & Michalska, K. J. (2010). Neurodevelopmental changes in the circuits underlying 
empathy and sympathy from childhood to adulthood. Developmental Science, 13, 886-899. 
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00940.x 
Dimaggio, G., Lysaker, P. H., Carcione, A., Nicolo, G., & Semerari, A. (2008). Know 
yourself and you shall know the other... to a certain extent: Multiple paths of influence of 
self-reflection on mindreading. Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 778-789. doi: 
10.1016/j.concog.2008.02.005 
Dunbar, R. I. M. (2008). Mind the gap: or why humans aren't just great apes. Proceedings of 
the British Academy, 154, 403-423. 
THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF MENTALIZING      35 
Dziobek, I., Preissler, S., Grozdanovic, Z., Heuser, I., Heekeren, H. R., & Roepke, S. (2011). 
Neuronal correlates of altered empathy and social cognition in borderline personality 
disorder. NeuroImage, 57, 539-548. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.05.005 
Ferris, C. F., Kulkarni, P., Sullivan, J. M., Harder, J. A., Messenger, T. L., & Febo, M. 
(2005). Pup suckling is more rewarding than cocaine: Evidence from functional magnetic 
resonance imaging and three-dimensional computational analysis. Journal of Neuroscience, 
25, 149-156. doi: 10.1523/Jneurosci.3156-04.2005 
Fertuck, E. A., Marsano-Jozefowicz, S., Stanley, B., Tryon, W. W., Oquendo, M., Mann, J. 
J., & Keilp, J. G. (2006). The impact of borderline personality disorder and anxiety on 
neuropsychological performance in major depression. Journal of Personality Disorders, 20, 
55-70. doi: 10.1521/pedi.2006.20.1.55 
Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., Jurist, E., & Target, M. (2002). Affect regulation, mentalization, and 
the development of the self. New York, NY: Other Press. 
Fonagy, P., & Luyten, P. (2009). A developmental, mentalization-based approach to the 
understanding and treatment of borderline personality disorder. Development and 
Psychopathology, 21, 1355-1381. doi: 10.1017/s0954579409990198 
Fonagy, P., & Luyten, P. (in press). A multilevel perspective on the development of 
borderline personality disorder. In D. Cicchetti (Ed.), Development and Psychopathology (3rd 
ed.). New York: Wiley. 
Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., & Allison, E. (2014). Teaching to learn from experience: Epistemic 
mistrust at the heart of BPD and its psychosocial treatment. Manuscript in preparation 
Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., & Allison, E. (2013b). Teaching to learn from experience: Epistemic 
mistrust, personality, and psychotherapy. Manuscript submitted for publication 
THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF MENTALIZING      36 
Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Bateman, A., Gergely, G., Strathearn, L., Target, M., & Allison, E. 
(2010). Attachment and personality pathology. In J. F. Clarkin, P. Fonagy & G. O. Gabbard 
(Eds.), Psychodynamic psychotherapy for personality disorders. A clinical handbook (pp. 37-
87). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing. 
Fonagy, P., Steele, M., Steele, H., Higgitt, A., & Target, M. (1994). The Emanuel Miller 
Memorial Lecture 1992. The theory and practice of resilience. Journal of Child Psychology 
and Psychiatry, 35, 231-257. 
Fonagy, P., & Target, M. (1997). Attachment and reflective function: Their role in self-
organization. Development and Psychopathology, 9, 679-700. 
Fredrickson, B. L. (2001). The role of positive emotions in positive psychology. The 
broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions. American Psychologist, 56, 218-226. 
Fries, E., Hesse, J., Hellhammer, J., & Hellhammer, D. H. (2005). A new view on 
hypocortisolism. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 30, 1010-1016. doi: 
10.1016/j.psyneuen.2005.04.006 
Frith, C. D., & Frith, U. (2006). The neural basis of mentalizing. Neuron, 50, 531-534. doi: 
10.1016/j.neuron.2006.05.001 
Gallese, V., Keysers, C., & Rizzolatti, G. (2004). A unifying view of the basis of social 
cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 396-403. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2004.07.002 
Garner, B., Chanen, A. M., Phillips, L., Velakoulis, D., Wood, S. J., Jackson, H. J., . . . 
McGorry, P. D. (2007). Pituitary volume in teenagers with first-presentation borderline 
personality disorder. Psychiatry Research, 156, 257-261. doi: 
10.1016/j.pscychresns.2007.05.001 
THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF MENTALIZING      37 
Gotlib, I. H., Hamilton, J. P., Cooney, R. E., Singh, M. K., Henry, M. L., & Joormann, J. 
(2010). Neural processing of reward and loss in girls at risk for major depression. Archives of 
General Psychiatry, 67, 380-387. doi: 10.1001/archgenpsychiatry.2010.13 
Gweon, H., Dodell-Feder, D., Bedny, M., & Saxe, R. (2012). Theory of mind performance in 
children correlates with functional specialization of a brain region for thinking about 
thoughts. Child Development, 83, 1853-1868. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2012.01829.x 
Hazlett, E. A., Zhang, J., New, A. S., Zelmanova, Y., Goldstein, K. E., Haznedar, M. M., . . . 
Chu, K. W. (2012). Potentiated amygdala response to repeated emotional pictures in 
borderline personality disorder. Biological Psychiatry, 72, 448-456. doi: 
10.1016/j.biopsych.2012.03.027 
Heim, C., Newport, D. J., Mletzko, T., Miller, A. H., & Nemeroff, C. B. (2008). The link 
between childhood trauma and depression: Insights from HPA axis studies in humans. 
Psychoneuroendocrinology, 33, 693-710. 
Heinrichs, M., & Domes, G. (2008). Neuropeptides and social behaviour: Effects of oxytocin 
and vasopressin in humans. Progress in Brain Research, 170, 337-350. doi: 10.1016/S0079-
6123(08)00428-7 
Herpertz, S. C., Jeung, H., Mancke, F., & Bertsch, K. (2014). Social dysfunctioning and brain 
in borderline personality disorder. Psychopathology, 47, 417-424. doi: 10.1159/000365106 
Holtmann, J., Herbort, M. C., Wustenberg, T., Soch, J., Richter, S., Walter, H., . . . Schott, B. 
H. (2013). Trait anxiety modulates fronto-limbic processing of emotional interference in 
borderline personality disorder. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 54. doi: 
10.3389/fnhum.2013.00054 
THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF MENTALIZING      38 
Hurlemann, R., Hawellek, B., Maier, W., & Dolan, R. J. (2007). Enhanced emotion-induced 
amnesia in borderline personality disorder. Psychological Medicine, 37, 971-981. doi: 
10.1017/S0033291706009792 
Insel, T. R., & Young, L. J. (2001). The neurobiology of attachment. Nature Reviews. 
Neuroscience, 2, 129-136. doi: 10.1038/35053579 
Jogems-Kosterman, B. J., de Knijff, D. W., Kusters, R., & van Hoof, J. J. (2007). Basal 
cortisol and DHEA levels in women with borderline personality disorder. Journal of 
Psychiatric Research, 41, 1019-1026. doi: 10.1016/j.jpsychires.2006.07.019 
Jurist, E. L. (2005). Mentalized affectivity. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 22, 426-444. doi: 
10.1037/0736-9735.22.3.426 
Kahl, K. G., Bens, S., Ziegler, K., Rudolf, S., Dibbelt, L., Kordon, A., & Schweiger, U. 
(2006). Cortisol, the cortisol-dehydroepiandrosterone ratio, and pro-inflammatory cytokines 
in patients with current major depressive disorder comorbid with borderline personality 
disorder. Biological Psychiatry, 59, 667-671. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2005.08.001 
King-Casas, B., Sharp, C., Lomax-Bream, L., Lohrenz, T., Fonagy, P., & Montague, P. R. 
(2008). The rupture and repair of cooperation in borderline personality disorder. Science, 321, 
806-810. doi: 10.1126/science.1156902 
Knutson, K. M., Mah, L., Manly, C. F., & Grafman, J. (2007). Neural correlates of automatic 
beliefs about gender and race. Human Brain Mapping, 28, 915-930. doi: 10.1002/hbm.20320 
Koenigsberg, H. W., Fan, J., Ochsner, K. N., Liu, X., Guise, K. G., Pizzarello, S., . . . Siever, 
L. J. (2009). Neural correlates of the use of psychological distancing to regulate responses to 
negative social cues: A study of patients with borderline personality disorder. Biological 
Psychiatry, 66, 854-863. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2009.06.010 
THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF MENTALIZING      39 
Kovacs, A. M., Teglas, E., & Endress, A. D. (2010). The social sense: susceptibility to others' 
beliefs in human infants and adults. Science, 330, 1830-1834. 
Kraus, A., Valerius, G., Seifritz, E., Ruf, M., Bremner, J. D., Bohus, M., & Schmahl, C. 
(2010). Script-driven imagery of self-injurious behavior in patients with borderline 
personality disorder: A pilot FMRI study. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 121, 41-51. doi: 
10.1111/j.1600-0447.2009.01417.x 
Kuipers, G. S., & Bekker, M. (2012). Attachment, Mentalization and Eating Disorders: A 
review of studies using the Adult Attachment Interview. Current Psychiatry Reviews, 8, 326-
336. doi: 10.2174/157340012803520478 
Lackner, C. L., Bowman, L. C., & Sabbagh, M. A. (2010). Dopaminergic functioning and 
preschoolers' theory of mind. Neuropsychologia, 48, 1767-1774. doi: 
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.02.027 
Ladegaard, N., Larsen, E. R., Videbech, P., & Lysaker, P. H. (2014). Higher-order social 
cognition in first-episode major depression. Psychiatry Research, 216, 37-43. 
Lee, R., Geracioti, T. D., Jr., Kasckow, J. W., & Coccaro, E. F. (2005). Childhood trauma 
and personality disorder: Positive correlation with adult CSF corticotropin-releasing factor 
concentrations. American Journal of Psychiatry, 162, 995-997. doi: 
10.1176/appi.ajp.162.5.995 
Lewis, P. A., Rezaie, R., Brown, R., Roberts, N., & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2011). Ventromedial 
prefrontal volume predicts understanding of others and social network size. NeuroImage, 57, 
1624-1629. doi: j.neuroimage.2011.05.030 
Lieberman, M. D. (2007). Social cognitive neuroscience: a review of core processes. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 58, 259-289. 
THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF MENTALIZING      40 
Lombardo, M. V., Barnes, J. L., Wheelwright, S. J., & Baron-Cohen, S. (2007). Self-
referential cognition and empathy in autism. PLOS ONE, 2, e883. doi: 
10.1371/journal.pone.0000883 
Lombardo, M. V., Chakrabarti, B., Bullmore, E. T., Wheelwright, S. J., Sadek, S. A., 
Suckling, J., . . . Baron-Cohen, S. (2010). Shared neural circuits for mentalizing about the self 
and others. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 22, 1623-1635. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2009.21287 
Luyten, P., & Fonagy, P. (2013). Probing the interpersonal phenotype of borderline 
personality disorder: An attachment and mentalizing perspective. Manuscript submitted for 
publication 
Luyten, P., Fonagy, P., Lemma, A., & Target, M. (2012). Depression. In A. Bateman & P. 
Fonagy (Eds.), Handbook of Mentalizing in mental health practice (pp. 385-417). 
Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association. 
Luyten, P., Fonagy, P., Lowyck, B., & Vermote, R. (2012). Assessment of mentalization. In 
A. W. Bateman & P. Fonagy (Eds.), Handbook of mentalizing in mental health practice (pp. 
43-65). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing. 
Main, M. (1991). Metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive monitoring, and singular 
(coherent) vs. multiple (incoherent) model of attachment: Findings and directions for future 
research. In C. M. Parkes, J. Stevenson-Hinde & P. Marris (Eds.), Attachment across the life 
cycle (pp. 127-159). London, UK: Tavistock/Routledge. 
Mayes, L. C. (2000). A developmental perspective on the regulation of arousal states. 
Seminars in Perinatology, 24, 267-279. 
THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF MENTALIZING      41 
Mayes, L. C. (2006). Arousal regulation, emotional flexibility, medial amygdala function, 
and the impact of early experience: comments on the paper of Lewis et al. Annals of the New 
York Academy of Sciences, 1094, 178-192. 
Meinlschmidt, G., & Heim, C. (2007). Sensitivity to Intranasal Oxytocin in Adult Men with 
Early Parental Separation. Biological Psychiatry, 61, 1109-1111. 
Mier, D., Lis, S., Esslinger, C., Sauer, C., Hagenhoff, M., Ulferts, J., . . . Kirsch, P. (2013). 
Neuronal correlates of social cognition in borderline personality disorder. Social Cognitive 
and Affective Neuroscience, 8, 531-537. doi: 10.1093/scan/nss028 
Mikulincer, M., & Shaver, P. R. (2007). Attachment in adulthood: Structure, dynamics, and 
change. New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Minzenberg, M. J., Fan, J., New, A. S., Tang, C. Y., & Siever, L. J. (2007). Fronto-limbic 
dysfunction in response to facial emotion in borderline personality disorder: An event-related 
fMRI study. Psychiatry Research, 155, 231-243. doi: 10.1016/j.pscychresns.2007.03.006 
Minzenberg, M. J., Grossman, R., New, A. S., Mitropoulou, V., Yehuda, R., Goodman, M., . 
. . Siever, L. J. (2006). Blunted hormone responses to ipsapirone are associated with trait 
impulsivity in personality disorder patients. Neuropsychopharmacology, 31, 197-203. doi: 
10.1038/sj.npp.1300853 
Montague, P. R., & Lohrenz, T. (2007). To detect and correct: Norm violations and their 
enforcement. Neuron, 56, 14-18. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2007.09.020 
Nater, U. M., Bohus, M., Abbruzzese, E., Ditzen, B., Gaab, J., Kleindienst, N., . . . Ehlert, U. 
(2010). Increased psychological and attenuated cortisol and alpha-amylase responses to acute 
psychosocial stress in female patients with borderline personality disorder. 
Psychoneuroendocrinology, 35, 1565-1572. doi: 10.1016/j.psyneuen.2010.06.002 
THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF MENTALIZING      42 
Neumann, I. D. (2008). Brain oxytocin: a key regulator of emotional and social behaviours in 
both females and males. Journal of Neuroendocrinology, 20, 858-865. 
New, A. S., Hazlett, E. A., Newmark, R. E., Zhang, J., Triebwasser, J., Meyerson, D., . . . 
Buchsbaum, M. S. (2009). Laboratory induced aggression: A positron emission tomography 
study of aggressive individuals with borderline personality disorder. Biological Psychiatry, 
66, 1107-1114. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2009.07.015 
Nolte, T., Bolling, D. Z., Hudac, C. M., Fonagy, P., Mayes, L., & Pelphrey, K. A. (2013). 
Brain mechanisms underlying the impact of attachment-related stress on social cognition. 
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 816. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00816 
Panksepp, J., & Watt, D. (2011). Why does depression hurt? Ancestral primary-process 
separation-distress (PANIC/GRIEF) and diminished brain reward (SEEKING) processes in 
the genesis of depressive affect. Psychiatry (Edgmont), 74, 5-13. doi: 
10.1521/psyc.2011.74.1.5 
Ripoll, L. H., Snyder, R., Steele, H., & Siever, L. J. (2013). The neurobiology of empathy in 
borderline personality disorder. Current Psychiatry Reports, 15, 344. doi: 10.1007/s11920-
012-0344-1 
Rizzolatti, G., & Craighero, L. (2004). The mirror-neuron system. Annual Review of 
Neuroscience, 27, 169-192. doi: 10.1146/annurev.neuro.27.070203.144230 
Rochat, P., & Striano, T. (1999). Social-cognitive development in the first year. In P. Rochat 
(Ed.), Early Social Cognition (pp. 3-34). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Ruocco, A. C., Medaglia, J. D., Tinker, J. R., Ayaz, H., Forman, E. M., Newman, C. F., . . . 
Chute, D. L. (2010). Medial prefrontal cortex hyperactivation during social exclusion in 
THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF MENTALIZING      43 
borderline personality disorder. Psychiatry Research, 181, 233-236. doi: 
10.1016/j.pscychresns.2009.12.001 
Sabbagh, M. A. (2004). Understanding orbitofrontal contributions to theory-of-mind 
reasoning: Implications for autism. Brain and Cognition, 55, 209-219. doi: 
10.1016/j.bandc.2003.04.002 
Salavert, J., Gasol, M., Vieta, E., Cervantes, A., Trampal, C., & Gispert, J. D. (2011). Fronto-
limbic dysfunction in borderline personality disorder: A 18F-FDG positron emission 
tomography study. Journal of Affective Disorders, 131, 260-267. doi: 
10.1016/j.jad.2011.01.001 
Satpute, A. B., & Lieberman, M. D. (2006). Integrating automatic and controlled processes 
into neurocognitive models of social cognition. Brain Research, 1079, 86-97. doi: 
10.1016/j.brainres.2006.01.005 
Schurz, M., Radua, J., Aichhorn, M., Richlan, F., & Perner, J. (2014). Fractionating theory of 
mind: A meta-analysis of functional brain imaging studies. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral 
Reviews, 42, 9-34. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.01.009 
Scott, L. N., Levy, K. N., & Granger, D. A. (2013). Biobehavioral reactivity to social 
evaluative stress in women with borderline personality disorder. Personality Disorders, 4, 91-
100. doi: 10.1037/a0030117 
Sebastian, C. L., Fontaine, N. M. G., Bird, G., Blakemore, S.-J., De Brito, S. A., McCrory, E. 
J. P., & Viding, E. (2012). Neural processing associated with cognitive and affective Theory 
of Mind in adolescents and adults. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7(1), 53-63. 
doi: 10.1093/scan/nsr023 
THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF MENTALIZING      44 
Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2013). Affiliation, empathy, and the origins of theory of 
mind. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 110 
(Suppl. 2), 10349-10356. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1301223110 
Shamay-Tsoory, S. G. (2011). The neural bases for empathy. Neuroscientist, 17, 18-24. doi: 
10.1177/1073858410379268 
Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., & Aharon-Peretz, J. (2007). Dissociable prefrontal networks for 
cognitive and affective theory of mind: A lesion study. Neuropsychologia, 45, 3054-3067. 
doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2007.05.021 
Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., Aharon-Peretz, J., & Levkovitz, Y. (2007). The neuroanatomical basis 
of affective mentalizing in schizophrenia: Comparison of patients with schizophrenia and 
patients with localized prefrontal lesions. Schizophrenia Research, 90, 274-283. doi: 
10.1016/j.schres.2006.09.020 
Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., Aharon-Peretz, J., & Perry, D. (2009). Two systems for empathy: A 
double dissociation between emotional and cognitive empathy in inferior frontal gyrus versus 
ventromedial prefrontal lesions. Brain, 132, 617-627. doi: 10.1093/brain/awn279 
Sharp, C., & Fonagy, P. (2008). The parent’s capacity to treat the child as a psychological 
agent: Constructs, measures and implications for developmental psychopathology. Social 
Development, 17, 737-754. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9507.2007.00457.x 
Sharp, C., Pane, H., Ha, C., Venta, A., Patel, A. B., Sturek, J., & Fonagy, P. (2011). Theory 
of mind and emotion regulation difficulties in adolescents with borderline traits. Journal of 
the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 50, 563-573. doi: 
10.1016/j.jaac.2011.01.017 
THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF MENTALIZING      45 
Silbersweig, D., Clarkin, J. F., Goldstein, M., Kernberg, O. F., Tuescher, O., Levy, K. N., . . . 
Stern, E. (2007). Failure of frontolimbic inhibitory function in the context of negative 
emotion in borderline personality disorder. American Journal of Psychiatry, 164, 1832-1841. 
doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.2007.06010126 
Simmons, W. K., Avery, J. A., Barcalow, J. C., Bodurka, J., Drevets, W. C., & Bellgowan, P. 
(2013). Keeping the body in mind: Insula functional organization and functional connectivity 
integrate interoceptive, exteroceptive, and emotional awareness. Human Brain Mapping, 34, 
2944-2958. doi: 10.1002/hbm.22113 
Skarderud, F. (2007). Eating one's words: Part III. Mentalisation-based psychotherapy for 
anorexia nervosa--an outline for a treatment and training manual. European Eating Disorders 
Review, 15, 323-339. doi: 10.1002/erv.817 
Slade, A. (2005). Parental reflective functioning: An introduction. Attachment and Human 
Development, 7, 269-281. doi: 10.1080/14616730500245906 
Sleed, M., & Fonagy, P. (2010). Understanding disruptions in the parent-infant relationship:  
Do actions speak louder than words? In T. Baradon (Ed.), Relational trauma in infancy 
London, UK: Routledge. 
Stanley, B., & Siever, L. J. (2010). The interpersonal dimension of borderline personality 
disorder: toward a neuropeptide model. American Journal of Psychiatry, 167, 24-39. doi: 
10.1176/appi.ajp.2009.09050744 
Strathearn, L., Fonagy, P., Amico, J., & Montague, P. R. (2009). Adult attachment predicts 
maternal brain and oxytocin response to infant cues. Neuropsychopharmacology, 34, 2655-
2666. doi: 10.1038/npp.2009.103 
THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF MENTALIZING      46 
Strathearn, L., Li, J., Fonagy, P., & Montague, P. R. (2008). What's in a smile? Maternal 
brain responses to infant facial cues. Pediatrics, 122, 40-51. doi: 10.1542/peds.2007-1566 
Tottenham, N., & Sheridan, M. A. (2009). A review of adversity, the amygdala and the 
hippocampus: a consideration of developmental timing. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 3, 
68. doi: 10.3389/neuro.09.068.2009 
Uddin, L. Q., Iacoboni, M., Lange, C., & Keenan, J. P. (2007). The self and social cognition: 
The role of cortical midline structures and mirror neurons. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 
153-157. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2007.01.001 
van Baaren, R. B., Holland, R. W., Kawakami, K., & van Knippenberg, A. (2004). Mimicry 
and prosocial behavior. Psychological Science, 15, 71-74. 
Van Overwalle, F. (2009). Social cognition and the brain: A meta-analysis. Human Brain 
Mapping, 30, 829-858. doi: 10.1002/hbm.20547 
Van Overwalle, F. (2011). A dissociation between social mentalizing and general reasoning. 
NeuroImage, 54, 1589-1599. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.09.043 
Van Overwalle, F., & Baetens, K. (2009). Understanding others' actions and goals by mirror 
and mentalizing systems: A meta-analysis. NeuroImage, 48, 564-584. doi: 
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.06.009 
Vrticka, P., Andersson, F., Grandjean, D., Sander, D., & Vuilleumier, P. (2008). Individual 
attachment style modulates human amygdala and striatum activation during social appraisal. 
PLoS One, 3, e2868. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0002868 
Vrticka, P., & Vuilleumier, P. (2012). Neuroscience of human social interactions and adult 
attachment style. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6, 212. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00212 
THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF MENTALIZING      47 
Walter, M., Bureau, J. F., Holmes, B. M., Bertha, E. A., Hollander, M., Wheelis, J., . . . 
Lyons-Ruth, K. (2008). Cortisol response to interpersonal stress in young adults with 
borderline personality disorder: A pilot study. European Psychiatry, 23, 201-204. doi: 
10.1016/j.eurpsy.2007.12.003 
Wingenfeld, K., Lange, W., Wulff, H., Berea, C., Beblo, T., Saavedra, A. S., . . . Driessen, M. 
(2007). Stability of the dexamethasone suppression test in borderline personality disorder 
with and without comorbid PTSD: A one-year follow-up study. Journal of Clinial 
Psychology, 63, 843-850. doi: 10.1002/jclp.20396 
Wingenfeld, K., Spitzer, C., Rullkotter, N., & Lowe, B. (2010). Borderline personality 
disorder: Hypothalamus pituitary adrenal axis and findings from neuroimaging studies. 
Psychoneuroendocrinology, 35, 154-170. doi: 10.1016/j.psyneuen.2009.09.014 
 
 
 
